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Abstract
Confronted with cases of restrictions of the right to manifest
religious beliefs of new religious minorities formed by recent
migration movements, the ECtHR and the UNHRC seem to
opt for different interpretations and applications of this
right, as recent conflicting decisions show. Based on an
empirical legal analysis of the two bodies’ decisions on indi-
vidual complaints, this article finds that these conflicting
decisions are part of a broader divergence: While the
UNHRC functions as a protector of new minorities against
States’ undue interference in their right to manifest their
religion, the ECtHR leaves it up to States how to deal with
religious diversity brought by new minorities. In addition, a
quantitative analysis of the relevant case law showed that
the ECtHR is much less likely to find a violation of the right
to freedom of religion in cases brought by new religious
minorities as opposed to old religious minorities. Although
this could be a hint towards double standards, a closer look
at the examined case law reveals that the numerical differ-
ences can be explained by the ECtHR’s weaker protection of
religious manifestations in the public as opposed to the pri-
vate sphere. Yet, this rule has an important exception: Con-
scientious objection to military service. By examining the
development of the relevant case law, this article shows that
this exception bases on a recent alteration of jurisprudence
by the ECtHR and that there are similar prospects for
change regarding other religious manifestations in the public
sphere.
Keywords: ECtHR, UNHRC, religious manifestations, reli-
gious minorities, empirical analysis
1 Introduction
Since several years now, religious intolerance has been
on the rise.1 In particular the so-called new religious
minorities originating from recent migration move-
ments, such as Sikhs or Muslims in some European
States, seem to encounter growing opposition to practic-
ing their religions. One example is the increasing hostil-
ity against Muslims, which led States to prohibit the
* PhD candidate at the University of Zurich.
1. See already UN Commission on Human Rights Res. 1986/20, 10 March
1986, which appointed a Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance.
In 2000, the mandate title was changed to Special Rapporteur on Free-
dom of Religion or Belief.
construction of minarets2 or the wearing of headscarves
in public schools.3 The question thus arises whether the
guarantees of religious freedom enshrined in interna-
tional human rights instruments like the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Right (hereinafter
ICCPR)4 or the European Convention of Human Rights
(hereinafter ECHR) are able to deal with this challenge
and ensure that everybody can enjoy freedom of religion
equally, ‘without distinction of any kind’.5
The respective supervisory bodies, namely the United
Nations Human Rights Committee (hereinafter
UNHRC) and the European Court of Human Rights
(hereinafter ECtHR), are responsible for adapting inter-
national human rights norms to the needs of today. By
applying and interpreting the abstract human rights
guarantees, such as the right to freedom of religion, in
specific cases or situations these supervisory bodies con-
tinuously shape and develop the understanding of
human rights.6 When it comes to new religious minori-
ties’ right to manifest their religious beliefs, diverging
interpretations by international human rights bodies can
be found. As an example, the complaints brought to the
ECtHR as well as the UNHRC based on a French law
prohibiting religious symbols or clothing in public
schools ‘by means of which students manifest their reli-
gious belonging in an ostentatious way’7 can be men-
tioned. Based on this law, several Muslim and Sikh stu-
dents were excluded from public schools because they
did not refrain from wearing a headscarf or a turban.
While the ECtHR declared all complaints manifestly ill-
founded and thus inadmissible,8 the UNHRC found a
2. See Art. 72(3) of the Swiss Constitution, introduced in the popular vote
of 29 November 2009.
3. Law no. 2004-228, 15 March 2004, available at: <https:// www.
legifrance. gouv. fr/ affichTexte. do ?cidTexte= JORFTEXT000000417977&
categorieLien= id>.
4. 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171.
5. Art. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December
1948 UNGA Res 217 A (III) (hereinafter UDHR).
6. C. Medina, ‘The Role of International Tribunals: Law-Making or Crea-
tive Interpretation?’, in D. Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
International Human Rights Law (2013) 649, at 651.
7. Law no. 2004-228 (above n. 3); Original wording: ‘[P]ar lesquels les
élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse’.
8. Aktas v. France, App. no. 43563/08 (ECHR, 30 June 2009); Bayrak v.
France, App. no. 14308/08 (ECHR, 30 June 2009); Gamaleddyn v.
France, App. no. 18527/08 (ECHR, 30 June 2009); Ghazal v. France,
App. no. 29134/08 (ECHR, 30 June 2009); Jasvir Singh v. France, App.
no. 25463/08 (ECHR, 30 June 2009); Ranjit Singh v. France, App. no.
27561/08 (ECHR, 30 June 2009).
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violation of the students’ right to manifest their
religion.9
Confronted with such apparent divergence, the present
article seeks to answer the following two questions,
which are based on a double comparison: Are the men-
tioned conflicting decisions of the UNHRC and the
ECtHR part of a broader divergence in the interpreta-
tion and application of new religious minorities’ right to
manifest their religion? Does the ECtHR adopt an
equally restrictive approach towards both old and new
religious minorities or can double standards in the
ECtHR’s jurisprudence be identified?
2 Methodological Remarks
When looking at the existing scholarship on freedom of
religion in international human rights law, a lack of
empirical legal research10 can be identified. Differently
than other scholarly work in this field, this article thus
puts forward a systematic analysis of the decisions and
recommendations taken in cases relating to religious
minorities’ right to manifest their religion brought
under the individual complaint mechanisms of the
ECtHR and the UNHRC. Taking a holistic approach to
the topic of minorities’ religious freedom, this research
not only includes decisions regarding the mentioned
new religious minorities, which have been present on
the territory of the State in question for a comparatively
short period of time, but also examines the interpreta-
tion and application of old religious minorities’ right to
manifest their religious beliefs. Such groups are charac-
terised by the long ties with the territory they inhabit.11
In order to interpret the findings of this empirical
research of the practice of the ECtHR (and the now
obsolete European Commission of Human Rights (here-
inafter EComHR)) as well as the UNHRC in the con-
text of individual applications, which are presented in
the third and fourth section, it is important to first clari-
fy the methodology. After raising some caveats for the
comparison of the practice of the supervisory bodies of
the ECHR and the ICCPR as well as a more meticulous
definition of the concepts of old and new religious
minorities, this section thus presents the detailed
research design used by this article.
2.1 Caveats for the Comparison of the ECtHR
and the UNHRC
The analysis put forward by this article takes into
account that the two bodies, the ECtHR and the
UNHRC, are operating in very different contexts:
9. UNHRC Bikramjit Singh v. France, UN Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/
1852/2008 (1 November 2012).
10. According to the definition adopted by this article, empirical research
‘involves the systematic collection of information (“data”) and its analy-
sis according to some generally accepted methods’ (P. Cane and H.
Kritzer, ‘Introduction’, in P. Cane and H. Kritzer (eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (2010) 1, at 4).
11. See, for further elaborations on the distinction of old and new religious
minorities, Section 2.2.
While the Council of Europe (CoE) is characterised by
the relatively homogenous legal and democratic systems
in Europe, the United Nations (UN) combine a ‘vast
range of ideological, religious and cultural founda-
tions’12 of government systems. Moreover, there are also
significant institutional differences between the two
supervisory bodies. The ECtHR, on the one hand, is
today a permanent body with one judge for every CoE
Member State.13 The UNHRC on the other hand is a
non-permanent body of independent experts, whose
eighteen members meet three times a year for three
weeks.14 A further institutional difference between the
two bodies lies in the fact that while the ECtHR’s main
function is the adjudication of individual applications,15
the UNHRC’s main task is the examination of State
reports.16 The UNHRC’s competence to consider indi-
vidual complaints is not included in the ICCPR, but
States can accept the jurisdiction of the UNHRC by rat-
ifying a separate Protocol to the ICCPR.17 For Signato-
ries of the ECHR, the acceptance of the ECtHR’s juris-
diction, however, is mandatory.
The last and maybe most crucial difference is the bind-
ingness of their decisions for Member States. While the
ECtHR’s judgments and decisions have binding force
for the Signatories, the UNHRC can only issue recom-
mendations, which are nevertheless of real legal signifi-
cance.18 With the interpretation and application of rele-
vant human rights guarantees, the UNHRC contributes
to specifying States’ human rights obligations and thus
shapes expectations towards States’ behaviour.19
Despite these differences, the idea of a comparison of
the application and interpretation of freedom of religion
in the context of individual complaints to the ECtHR
and the UNHRC seems compelling because the two
bodies interpret provisions with a very similar
wording.20 In particular the general guarantee of reli-
gious freedom in Articles 9(1) ECHR and 18(1) ICCPR
as well as the limitation clauses in Section 2 of the
respective provisions were drafted in a nearly identical
way. Both provisions are furthermore historically inter-
related as Article 18 UDHR strongly influenced both.
In fact, the intention of the drafters was to base Article 9
ECHR ‘as far as possible on the UDHR in order to
reduce the risk of devising definitions that were at odds
with those in UN instruments’.21 Thus, it is interesting
to examine how the different systems developed the
interpretation and application of this human right in the
12. P. Taylor, Freedom of Religion – UN and European Human Rights Law
and Practice (2005), at 4.
13. Arts. 19 and 20 ECHR.
14. Art. 37 ICCPR.
15. Art. 34 ECHR.
16. Art. 40 ICCPR.
17. First Additional Protocol to the ICCPR, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS
171.
18. Art. 46 ECHR; Art. 5 First Additional Protocol to the ICCPR; N. Rodley,
‘The Role and Impact of Treaty Bodies’, in Shelton (ed.), above n. 6, at
639.
19. Rodley, above n. 18, at 639.
20. For an earlier comparison of the two bodies, see Taylor, above n. 12.
21. Ibid., at 7; for further details see C. Evans, Freedom of Religion under
the European Convention on Human Rights (2001), at 33 ff.
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course of their numerous years of activity and how they
are coping with the challenges posed to the right to
manifest religious beliefs today.22
2.2 Defining the Concepts: Old and New
Religious Minorities
The basic conceptual distinction of the present research
is between two groups, namely old religious minorities
and new religious minorities originating from migration.
When trying to develop a definition of these two con-
cepts, it needs to be noted that the definition of the term
minority has been subject to controversy for many years
now and no legally binding definition could be found on
the international level.23 At first, scholars and interna-
tional bodies opted for a restrictive definition of the
term ‘minority’, including only groups consisting of citi-
zens of the State in question and/or having historical,
long-standing ties with the territory they inhabit.24
While States, such as Norway and Switzerland, still
argue that only so-called old or traditional minorities
should be included in the definition of the term ‘minori-
ty’,25 the general consensus today tends towards a defi-
nition encompassing also ‘new minorities’ formed by
recent migration, who have thus lived on the territory
for a comparatively short period of time. Consequently,
a significant part of scholarship as well as international
bodies, for example the UNHRC, argue that the term
‘minority’ is not limited to a fixed set of groups, but
rather evolving with time.26
22. This article focuses on general human rights guarantees, which play a
significant role in modern international minority protection; see UN Eco-
nomic and Social Council, ‘Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities’, Progress report on the update to the study on peaceful
and constructive approaches to situations involving minorities submitted
by A. Eide, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/21, 17 June 2003, at para.
40.
23. For an overview of the discussions and attempts, see K. Henrard, Devis-
ing an Adequate System of Minority Protection (2000), at 18 ff.
24. See, for example, the definition put forward by Francesco Capotorti,
Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: ‘A group numerical-
ly inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant
position, whose members – being nationals of the state – possess eth-
nic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest
of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity,
directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or lan-
guage.’ (‘Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384, 20 June 1977).
25. See, for example, Council of Europe, Reservations and Declarations for
Treaty No. 157 – Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, <www. coe. int/ en/ web/ conventions/ full -list/ -/ conventions/
treaty/ 157/ declarations ?p_ auth= 2RpNP29s> (last visited 20 February
2017), in particular the declarations of Armenia, Germany, Georgia,
Austria, Moldavia, Czech Republic, Switzerland and Norway.
26. See, for example, European Commission for Democracy Through Law
(Venice Commission), Report on Non-Citizens and Minority Rights,
CDL-AD(2007)001, 18 January 2007; A. Eide, ‘The Rights of “New”
Minorities: Scope and Restrictions’, in K. Henrard (ed.), Double Stand-
ards in Minority Protection (2010), at 165; R. Medda-Windischer, Old
and New Minorities: Reconciling Diversity and Cohesion – A Human
Rights Model for Minority Integration (2009); K. Henrard, ‘Minority
Specific Rights: A Protection of Religious Minorities Going Beyond the
Freedom of Religion?’, 8(5) European Yearbook of Minority 5, at 7
(2009); J. Ringelheim, ‘Minority Rights in a Time of Multiculturalism –
The Evolving Scope of the Framework Convention on the Protection of
National Minorities’, 10(1) Human Rights Law Review 99, at 110 ff.
(2010).
An exhaustive presentation of the different arguments
brought forward in the controversy surrounding the
definition of the term ‘minority’ would go beyond the
scope, and purpose, of this article. It shall thus suffice to
highlight that discussions on the rights of both old and
new minorities, independently of the terminology used,
can be seen as forming part of the broader question of
how and whether the separate identity of groups, which
are religiously, but also ethnically, culturally or linguis-
tically, diverse from the dominant population, should be
protected. Considering that the aim of this article is in
fact to compare the protection of such minority groups’
religious freedom by two international human rights
bodies, the terminology of old and new minorities fits
this purpose best.
Though, in the context of religious minorities, it needs
to be clarified that this article does not aim at so-called
‘new religious movements’, for example Scientology,
but rather focuses on new religious minorities, which
were formed because of recent migration movements,
but adhere to traditional religions. The emphasis lies
thus on the link of new religious minorities with migra-
tion, as this is also highlighted by the scholars using the
terminology.27 In this context the term ‘new minority’ is
used to emphasise the fact that children, whose parents
or grandparents immigrated to a certain country, cannot
be included in the term migrants, as they have in fact
not migrated themselves.28 Instead they should be called
new minorities, who are distinguished from old minori-
ties by means of the criteria of the time they are present
on the territory of the State in question. Whether a spe-
cific group can be qualified as a new or old religious
minority depends thus on its demographic development
in a certain State, which makes the distinction used by
the article, like the definition of the term minority in
general, inherently relative.29 Thus, the categorisation
of specific groups has to be determined on a case-by-
case basis.
Based on this distinction, specific groups have been
selected, which allows us to draw representative results
from the empirical legal research, while at the same time
respecting the inherent limitations of this article. Thus,
out of the applicants alleging a violation of their right to
freedom of religion in a complaint to the UNHRC or
the ECtHR, only groups that have brought at least one
complaint to both the UNHRC and the ECtHR were
included, as otherwise a comparison of the two
approaches would be impossible.
Accordingly, the category new religious minority includes
only cases brought by persons adhering to the Sikh and
Muslim faith. In the countries, against which the inclu-
ded cases were directed, these groups represent mem-
bers of groups formed by recent migration movements,
which have lived on the territory for a comparatively
short time. As an example, Muslims, who have emigra-
27. See, for example, Medda-Windischer, above n. 26, at 40 ff.
28. See also ibid., at 51.
29. See P. Vuciri Ramaga, ‘Relativity of the Minority Concept’, 14(1)
Human Rights Quarterly 104 (1992).
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ted for example from Turkey to Germany, but also their
children and grandchildren, can be mentioned. For the
category old religious minority, these are members of
Jewish and Muslim30 communities as well as Jehovah’s
Witnesses and Baptists. These groups categorised as old
minorities can be seen as having long-standing ties with
the territory or State they inhabit.31 The Baptist Church
for example was established already in 160932 and Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses’ origins can be traced back to the 19th
century.33
2.3 Data Collection34
For the EComHR and the ECtHR, the data used for
conducting the empirical research was collected using
the hudoc jurisprudence database.35 All judgments on
the merits and decisions on the admissibility, in which
the applicant had alleged a violation of Article 9 ECHR,
were included in the search. This does not necessarily
entail that the ECtHR (respectively the EComHR) dealt
with the case under Article 9 ECHR.36 This search yiel-
ded 1,403 results as of 31 December 2016. Subsequent-
ly, a range of restrictions were applied to this set of data:
– Cases where the claimant had brought forward Arti-
cle 9 ECHR, but which in fact did not raise any ques-
tion under this guarantee, were excluded.
– Complaints declared inadmissible based on Article 35
ECHR were in general excluded from the collection,
except for complaints that were declared inadmissible
as they were manifestly ill-founded, because such
decision involves often an assessment of the merits of
the case.37
– The cases were limited according to the above-speci-
fied definition of old and new religious minorities to
complaints brought forward by persons or associa-
tions belonging to these two categories.
– Complaints brought forward by religious associations
or communities regarding legal recognition were
excluded, as the focus of this article lies on the possi-
bility of the individual to enjoy the right to freedom
of religion.38
30. Depending on their historical development in the State in question,
Muslims can be both an old and a new minority.
31. For the community of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Austria, see Religionsge-
meinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and others v. Austria, App. no.
40825/98 (ECHR, 31 July 2008), at para. 98.
32. R. Johnson, A Global Introduction to Baptist Churches (2010), at XVI
ff.
33. G. Chryssides, Jehovah’s Witnesses – Continuity and Change (2016), at
25 ff.
34. The design of the empirical research is based on the guidelines for
empirical legal research as presented by L. Epstein and A. Martin,
‘Quantitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Cane and
Kritzer (eds.), above n. 10, at 901; L. Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches
to Empirical Legal Research’, in Cane and Kritzer (eds.), above n. 10, at
926.
35. Available at: <http:// hudoc. echr. coe. int>.
36. See, for example, Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece, ECHR 1997-III 1.
37. See, for example, ECtHR Aktas v. France, above n. 8.
38. Although it is acknowledged that such legal recognition can have signif-
icant consequences for the religious freedom of individual members of
such communities, considering all relevant decisions would go beyond
the scope of the present article.
This led to a final sample of seventy-two cases39 for the
ECtHR.
The same approach was adopted for the case law of the
UNHRC, collected via the UN jurisprudence
database.40 The search of the jurisprudence of the
UNHRC based on Article 18 ICCPR yielded 51 results
as of 31 December 2016, which were then limited as
well according to the above-specified criteria to a final
sample of seventeen cases for the UNHRC.
Compared to the seventy-two cases brought to the
ECtHR, this amount seems rather small. In this regard,
it should be noted that among the various UN human
rights bodies, the UNHRC has dealt with individual
complaints for the longest and its case law is the most
comprehensive and developed.41 Moreover, there is no
special UN human rights treaty on the freedom of reli-
gion or on the rights of minorities.42 Nevertheless, the
UNHRC has received significantly fewer complaints
than the ECtHR from religious minorities. Though,
despite the difference in numbers between the two bod-
ies’ practice, the empirical research can lead to indica-
tive results as the seventeen cases represent the cases,
which are relevant to the topic of the article and could
be found based on the above-specified method of data
collection.43 Consequently, based on these seventeen
cases, general conclusions can be drawn regarding the
approach towards old and new religious minorities’
right to freedom of religion adopted by the UNHRC.
3 Divergence in the Protection
of New Minorities’ Right to
Freedom of Religion
After having presented the design of the empirical legal
research, which lies at the heart of this article’s inquiry,
this section analyses the first comparative question
posed, namely whether the conflicting decisions of the
UNHRC and the ECtHR, which can be found regard-
ing the French Loi Stasi,44 reflect a broader tendency
for divergence in the interpretation and application of
39. It is important to highlight that this research in general takes a case-
based approach, that means that the numbers refer to ‘the collection of
facts on a particular series of events and relevant legal material, leading
to a formal legal decision by the Court’ (S. Altwicker-Hàmori, T. Alt-
wicker & A. Peters, ‘Measuring Violations of Human Rights – An Empiri-
cal Analysis of Awards in Respect of Non-Pecuniary Damage under the
European Convention on Human Rights’, 76(1) Zeitschrift für auslän-
disches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1, at 24 (2016)).
40. Available at: <http:// juris. ohchr. org/ search/ Documents>.
41. Rodley, above n. 18, at 634.
42. See, however, the UNGA ‘Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief’, UN Doc.
A/RES/36/55, 25 November 1981; UNGA ‘Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minor-
ities’, UN Doc. A/RES/47/135, 18 December 1992; UNGA ‘Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, UN Doc. A/RES/61/295, 2 Octo-
ber 2007.
43. See M.A. Hall and R.F. Wright, ‘Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions’, 96(1) California Law Review 63, at 101 ff (2008).
44. See Section 1.
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new religious minorities’ right to freedom of religion by
the two bodies. The present section seeks to answer
such question first based on a quantitative analysis of
the cases selected for the empirical analysis, which
introduces the key points of the divergence between the
two bodies’ case law. By means of an in-depth analysis
of the reasoning applied in certain factually comparable
cases, a second part of this section then highlights that
the interpretation and application of new minorities’
right to manifest their religious beliefs by the UNHRC
and the ECtHR are diverging.
3.1 The Two Bodies’ Practice in Numbers
Out of the final sample of eighty-nine cases, twenty-sev-
en concerned groups belong to the category new religious
minority according to the above-specified definition. A
quantitative comparison of the practice of the ECtHR
with that of the UNHRC relating to complaints brought
by new religious minorities according to the limited
scope put forward above, namely Sikhs and Muslims,
allows us to observe significant differences in the per-
centage of violations found and complaints declared
inadmissible.
The UNHRC has received five complaints by new reli-
gious minorities alleging a violation of their right to
manifest their religion. In three of these complaints, all
brought by Sikhs, that is 60 per cent of all cases, the
State was found to have violated Article 18 ICCPR. In
one case, also brought by a Sikh, no violation was found
(20 per cent) and one complaint brought by a Muslim
was declared inadmissible (20 per cent).
By contrast, the ECtHR or the now obsolete EComHR
have received twenty-two complaints from Muslim and
Sikh new minorities and did not consider any of these
complaints a violation of Article 9 ECHR. Only in four
cases, that is 18 per cent, the ECtHR examined the mer-
its of the case, but found no violation. More than 80 per
cent, that is eighteen cases, were not examined on the
merits, but declared manifestly ill-founded and thus
inadmissible. This might hint towards a much more
restrictive interpretation of new minorities’ right to
manifest their religious beliefs compared to the
UNHRC, where 60 per cent of the cases were found to
amount to a violation (Table 1).
The most salient in the results of this empirical legal
analysis might be that for thirty years, namely from
1978, when the first relevant complaint was brought to
the EComHR,45 until 2008,46 all complaints of new reli-
gious minorities had been declared inadmissible. Also,
following these two decisions in 2008, only two more
cases have been examined on their merits, one of them
by the Grand Chamber.47
3.2 A Look behind the Numbers
The most striking difference perceivable from the quan-
titative comparison of the two bodies’ practice appears
to be the fact that the ECtHR did not find any violation
of the right to manifest their religion of a member of a
new minority, while the UNHRC found three despite
being confronted with a much smaller number of
claims. Nevertheless, these numerical differences alone
are not sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a
divergence in the international protection of new minor-
ities’ right to manifest their religious beliefs, as law does
not operate according to mathematical rules. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to examine whether any of the
cases, in which the UNHRC found a violation of Article
18 ICCPR, was based on similar facts as the cases in
which the ECtHR did not find a violation or which were
declared inadmissible.
All three decisions, in which the UNHRC found a vio-
lation, concern members of the Sikh community in
France. Two cases concern the practice of French
authorities to require the removal of religious symbols
such as turbans and headscarves for official photo-
graphs. In the case Ranjit Singh v. France48 regarding
the requirement to appear bareheaded on the photo for
the residence permit, the UNHRC decided that France
had not given reasons for how this requirement would
contribute to ensuring public safety. Furthermore, it did
not see how this would facilitate the identification of the
applicant or lower the risk for fraud or falsification of
the residence permit. It denied thus the proportionality
of the interference with Mr. Singh’s right to manifest
his religion. The same reasoning was applied to the sec-
ond case, Shingara Mann Singh v. France,49 in which the
applicant was required to provide a photo without a tur-
45. X. v. the United Kingdom (1978), DR 14, 234.
46. See Dogru v. France, App. no. 27058/05 (ECHR, 4 December 2008) as
well as Kervanci v. France, App. no. 31645/04 (ECHR, 4 December
2008).
47. See S.A.S. v. France [GC], ECHR 2014-III 291 (extracts); Ebrahimian v.
France, ECHR 2015.
48. UNHRC Ranjit Singh v. France, UN Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1876/2009,
27 September 2011.
49. UNHRC Shingara Mann Singh v. France, UN Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/
1928/2010, 26 September 2013.
Table 1 Percentages of violations, no violations and inadmissibility decisions of the UNHRC and the ECtHR
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ban for his passport, when he renewed it for the fifth
time.
Interestingly, the same applicant had brought a com-
plaint to the ECtHR five years earlier,50 alleging that the
refusal of French authorities to renew his drivers’
licence, because he did not provide a photo without the
turban, violated Article 9 ECHR.51 The ECtHR had
declared his complaint manifestly ill-founded and thus
inadmissible. Without examining the case in depth, the
Court supported the reasoning brought forward by
France that the bareheaded photograph was necessary
for the identification of the applicant and to prevent
fraud or falsification.52
It seems thus that the UNHRC consciously adopted a
decision, which directly contradicted the decision taken
by the ECtHR some years earlier.53 Although France
had invoked the decision taken by the ECtHR in this
regard,54 the UNHRC did not mention it at all in its
own elaborations on the merits of the case. The same
can be observed in the set of cases55 mentioned in the
introduction of this article, namely regarding the
French Loi Stasi,56 prohibiting ostentatious religious
symbols or clothing in public schools. This law can be
set in the context of the implementation of the French
constitutional principle of laïcité,57 which is defined pri-
marily by the non-religious nature of the French
Republic and public service.58 Such religious neutrality
towards all religions shall guarantee freedom of belief
and conscience.59 Also here, the decisions of the ECtHR
had been taken some years before the UNHRC decided
50. See, for an analysis of the relationship of the UNHRC and the ECtHR
regarding cases where the same or a similar complaint is brought to
both bodies, C. Phuong, ‘The Relationship Between the European Court
of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee: Has the “Same
Matter” Already Been “Examined”?’, 7(2) Human Rights Law Review
385 (2007).
51. Mann Singh v. France, App. no. 24479/07 (ECHR, 13 November 2008).
52. This approach might also be connected with general obscurities with
regard to the proportionality test applied by the ECtHR; see E. Brems
and L. Lavrysen, ‘“Don’t Use a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut”: Less
Restrictive Means in the Case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights’, 2015 Human Rights Law Review 1; J. Kratochvíl, ‘The Inflation
of the Margin of Appreciation by the European Court of Human
Rights’, 29 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 324 (2011).
53. See, for another example, UNHRC Maria Cruz Achabal Puertas v.
Spain, UN Doc. CCPR/C/107/D/1945/2010, 27 March 2013, discussed
by J. Gerards, ‘Inadmissibility Decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights: A Critique of the Lack of Reasoning’, 14 Human Rights
Law Review 148 (2014).
54. See UNHRC Ranjit Singh v. France, above n. 48, at para. 5.2.
55. UNHRC Bikramjit Singh v. France, above n. 9; ECtHR Jasvir Singh v.
France, above n. 8; ECtHR Ranjit Singh v. France, above n. 8; ECtHR
Aktas v. France, above n. 8; ECtHR Bayrak v. France, above n. 8; ECtHR
Gamaleddyn v. France, above n. 8.
56. Law no. 2004-228, above n. 3.
57. See W. de Been, ‘The Quest of Neutrality and the Stench of History’, in
J. Temperman (ed.), The Lautsi Papers: Reflections on Religious Sym-
bols in the Public School Classroom (2012) 177, at 184; for an in-depth
analysis see E. Bribosia, G. Caceres & I. Rorive, ‘Les Signes Religieux au
Coeur d’un Bras de Fer entre Genève et Paris: La Saga Singh’, 98 Revue
Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme 495 (2014).
58. P.-H. Prélot, ‘Définir Juridiquement la Laïcité’, in G. Gonzalez (ed.), Laï-
cité, Liberté de Religion et Convention Européenne des Droits de
l’Homme: Actes du Colloque le 18 Novembre 2005 (2006) 115, at 117.
59. Ibid.
on the complaint; the latter, however, again did not fol-
low the ECtHR’s decisions on the same matter.
Apart from these two examples of the UNHRC’s con-
scious contradiction of the ECtHR’s approach, the
divergence in the approach of the two human rights
bodies can also be detected in the rest of their case law
regarding new religious minorities’ right to manifest
their religious beliefs. A detailed comparison clearly
shows that the two bodies interpret the permitted limi-
tations to the right to manifest religious beliefs embed-
ded in the ECHR and the ICCPR and their task in its
protection very differently. While the UNHRC opts for
an in-depth and concrete verification of the arguments
brought forward by both parties and thus applies strict
scrutiny, the ECtHR in all cases decided to leave the
national authorities a wide margin of appreciation.60
The ECtHR generally does not scrutinise the arguments
brought forward by the State,61 the UNHRC on the
other hand examines whether the justification put for-
ward for the interference with the respective applicant’s
right to freedom of religion holds true in the concrete
case. Hence, the ECtHR does not seem very keen on
touching on the issue of religious diversity brought by
new religious minorities, leaving it up to Member States
how to deal with the issue.62 By contrast, the UNHRC
acts as a protector of new religious minorities against
undue interference in their right to manifest their reli-
gion by States.
This does not necessarily mean that for the UNHRC,
every restriction amounts to a violation, as the admitted-
ly not very recent case Karnel Singh Binder v. Canada63
exemplifies. The case concerned a person adhering to
the Sikh faith who worked as an electrician for the
Canadian National Railway Company. When a hardhat
requirement was introduced, Mr Singh Binder, who
was wearing a turban for religious reasons, was offered a
transfer to another post, which he refused. His employ-
60. See also Bribosia et al., above n. 57, at 495 ff. It should be noted here
that in recent years Member States have significantly criticised the
ECtHR, which has created a strong movement towards more deference
to national instances. As a consequence, the principle of subsidiarity and
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, which have been used by
the ECtHR to grant deference to Member States, are to be introduced
to the preamble of the ECHR by the Additional Protocol No. 15, which
has not yet entered into force. The Court’s strong reliance on the mar-
gin of appreciation may thus very likely be linked to such movement,
which is however not the focus of this article. For a more detailed
account of the concept of margin of appreciation and its use by the
ECtHR, see Kratochvíl, above n. 52.
61. As was highlighted many times, the granting of the margin of apprecia-
tion by the ECtHR goes hand in hand with restricted scrutiny: see, for
example, K. Henrard, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine of the ECtHR, with Special Attention to Rights of a Traditional
Way of Life and a Healthy Environment: A Call for an Alternative Model
of International Supervision’, IV The Yearbook of Polar Law 365, at 366
ff. (2012).
62. This approach can be based on a variety of reasons, but has been con-
vincingly shown to be linked to how controversially an issue is discussed
(see K. Henrard, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation on Grounds of
Religion in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: A
Tale of (Baby) Steps Forward and Missed Opportunities’, 14(4) Interna-
tional Journal of Constitutional Law 961, in particular at 983 (2016)).
63. UNHRC Karnel Singh Binder v. Canada, UN Doc CCPR/C/37/D/
208/1986, 9 November 1989.
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ment was then terminated. The UNHRC found no vio-
lation of the applicant’s freedom of religion as it saw the
requirement to protect workers from injury and electric
shocks as reasonable and directed towards objective pur-
poses.64 This approach is similar to the EComHR’s in a
case regarding the mandatory wearing of crash helmets
on motorcycles.65 Although it is unclear whether the
UNHRC would adopt the same approach today as it has
more than twenty-five years ago, one important differ-
ence certainly remains the same: The EComHR
declared the complaint manifestly ill-founded and did
thus not examine the merits of the case.66
Considering the fact that more than 80 per cent of the
analysed complaints brought by new religious minorities
to the ECtHR and the EComHR were declared inad-
missible, this could be suggestive of a more general
issue: It seems that the ECtHR does not want to inter-
fere with States’ approaches to dealing with religious
diversity, which is a very controversial issue today. In
the clear majority of the cases, this means that the com-
plaint is not even examined on the merits, but it is
declared that the allegations of a violation of the right to
manifest religious beliefs lack any foundation. By
declaring such a large amount of complaints brought by
new religious minorities inadmissible, the ECtHR thus
refuses to participate in the manifold discussions on the
human rights conformity of such restrictions of new
minorities’ religious freedom and negates basic princi-
ples of procedural justice to new religious minorities.67
Thus, the question arises whether this is a general
approach taken by the ECtHR in the context of religious
groups facing difficulties in realising their right to mani-
fest their religion, or whether this is only the case for
new religious minorities. If the latter would hold true,
this would not only indicate divergence between the
UNHRC and the ECtHR, but also double standards
from the side of the ECtHR to new minorities’ com-
plaints alleging a violation of their right to manifest their
religious beliefs.68
4 Double Standards in the
Protection of Old and New
Religious Minorities?
This section seeks to reflect on the second comparative
question posed by this article, namely whether, apart
64. For a critical account of this recommendation, see S. Joseph and M.
Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases,
Materials, and Commentary (2013), at 574.
65. See ECtHR X. v. the United Kingdom, above n. 45.
66. See also the article of Gerards, above n. 53, highlighting the same issue
for a different set of cases.
67. See also E. Brems and L. Lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights
Adjudication: The European Court of Human Rights’, 35(1) Human
Rights Quarterly 176, at 186 (2013).
68. This article recognises that there are many different factors influencing
the line a particular judicial body choses, and focuses however on the
distinction between old and new minorities as one potential factor.
from interpreting and applying the right to manifest
religious beliefs in the context of claims of new religious
minorities more restrictively than the UNHRC, the
ECtHR also follows a different approach for old than for
new religious minorities. In order to do so, the same
quantitative analytical methods as for the case law
regarding new religious minorities was applied to com-
plaints brought by old religious minorities.69 The results
of this analysis show that the ECtHR is more likely to
find a violation of the right to manifest religious beliefs
of old religious minorities than of new religious minori-
ties. Subsequently, an attempt to justify the numerical
differences found is made, to determine whether the
ECtHR’s approach to new religious minorities’ claims is
based on double standards or can rather be explained
based on factual differences of the cases.
4.1 A Quantitative Perspective on the Relevant
Practice
Out of the fifty decisions the ECtHR and the EComHR
issued with regard to old religious minorities, thirty,
that is 60 per cent, found a violation of the right to free-
dom of religion. In seven cases, that is 14 per cent, no
violation was found. Thirteen complaints, which
amount to 26 per cent, were declared manifestly ill-
founded and thus inadmissible. When comparing these
abstract percentages to the ones for new religious
minorities’ complaints, it is striking that here, a reverse
trend is observable: For new minorities, no complaint
was seen to amount to a violation of Article 9 ECHR,
while for old religious minorities over half of the deci-
sions, namely 60 per cent, found a violation. Further-
more, only 26 per cent of old religious minorities’ com-
plaints were declared inadmissible while for new minor-
ities this amounted to more than 80 per cent (Figure 1).
For the UNHRC, such reverse trend cannot be
observed: In all twelve cases brought by old religious
minorities, the UNRHC found a violation. Although
this is a higher percentage than for new religious minor-
ities, where 60 per cent of the recommendations found a
violation, the differences do not appear very significant,
in particular when taking into account that the sample
for new minorities only includes five cases.
Thus, the question arises: Are we confronted with dou-
ble standards in the case law of the ECtHR? Taking a
closer look at the four groups hidden behind the seem-
ingly obvious double standards in the ECtHR’s case
law, one gets a mixed impression: Most complaints were
brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses, of which a very high
number of cases, namely 71.4 per cent, were seen as
amounting to a violation. Surprisingly, the largest per-
centage of violations was found for complaints brought
by old Muslim minorities, namely 80 per cent. Only in
one case no violation was found and one complaint was
declared inadmissible. By contrast, for complaints
brought by new Muslim minorities not one violation
69. Due to the reasons specified in Section 2.2, groups included in the defi-
nition of old minorities were restricted to Jews, Muslims, Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses and Baptists.
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was found and 73.3 per cent of the complaints were not
examined on the merits, because they were declared
inadmissible (Table 2).
Therefore, the percentages regarding complaints
brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses and old Muslim minor-
ities support the initial impression of an incoherent
approach in the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 9
ECHR in the context of old and new religious minori-
ties. Comparing these abstract percentages to new Mus-
lim or Sikh minorities would thus sustain the assump-
tion that the ECtHR applies the relevant guarantees dif-
ferently to old religious minorities’ complaints than to
those of new religious minorities.
Yet, the cases regarding Baptists paint an entirely differ-
ent picture: All three complaints were declared mani-
festly ill-founded, which amounts to the largest percent-
age of inadmissibility decisions, namely 100 per cent.
Also, the percentages calculated for complaints brought
by members of the Jewish community give the impres-
sion, that the right to manifest religious beliefs has been
interpreted in a restrictive fashion: Out of nine com-
plaints, five were declared inadmissible. This amounts
to half of the total number of inadmissibility decisions
taken regarding old religious minorities. Only in two
cases, that is 22.2 per cent, the ECtHR found a viola-
tion, of which one was a chamber decision that was later
overturned by the Grand Chamber.70 The cases regard-
ing Baptists and Jews would thus rather serve as an
argument against double standards. Considering the
mixed conclusions drawn from an analysis of the per-
centages for individual groups, the next part examines
the facts of the cases behind the numbers and tries to
justify the numerical differences.
4.2 An Attempt to Explain the Numerical
Differences
Research has revealed a general tendency of the ECtHR
for weaker protection of manifestations of religious
beliefs outside the sphere of the religious community
and the private home, i.e. in the public sphere.71 The
ECtHR appears thus to be more cautious in interfering
with States’ discretion in such cases. By means of a
comparison of the aspects of the right to freedom of reli-
gion as well as the factual circumstances at issue in the
cases included in the above-presented numerical analy-
ses, this conceptual distinction between the public and
private sphere has been identified as one of many poten-
70. Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], ECHR 2000-VII 195.
71. See J. Ringelheim, ‘Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The Europe-
an Court of Human Rights in Search of a Theory?’, in L. Zucca and C.
Ungureanu (eds.), Law, State and Religion in the New Europe: Debates
and Dilemmas (2012), at 283.



























Table 2 Percentages of violations, no violations and inadmissibility decisions of the ECtHR and the EComHR
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tial reasons for the differences discovered.72 Conse-
quently, the rest of this article will focus its attention on
the potentialities of the distinction between the public
and private sphere to explain the revealed numerical dif-
ferences.
4.2.1 The Public and Private Distinction as a Rule
Taking a closer look at the nine cases brought by old
Muslim minorities, all the cases in which a violation was
found concerned individuals, who wanted to manifest
their religious belief within a religious community. In a
case concerning Moldova, for example, the ECtHR
found that the dispersal of a private religious ceremony
by the police and the subsequent prosecution for prac-
ticing a non-recognised religion violated the right to
freedom of religion.73 Many cases were also brought
against public interference with the organisational struc-
ture of a religious community. In a case, in which the
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found a violation of
Article 9 ECHR, for instance, Bulgaria had refused to
register an elected leader of the Muslim religious com-
munity, and instead replaced him with a leadership
chosen by the State.74
Only the case Kosteski v. Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, concerned a manifestation of religious belief
in the public sphere, namely a person who was fined for
missing work on a Muslim religious holiday.75 Interest-
ingly, this was at the same time the only complaint that
came from a member of an old Muslim minority, in
which the ECtHR did not find a violation of Article 9
ECHR. Furthermore, this is the only decision compara-
ble to the cases brought by new Muslim minorities,
because it also concerns a public manifestation of reli-
gious beliefs. In the cases brought by members of new
Muslim minorities, which concerned for example the
wearing of a headscarf or a burqa in schools or public
places,76 the applicants confronted other people with
their religious beliefs and requested tolerance and
accommodation of their religious manifestations instead
of prohibition or exclusion. As already mentioned, the
denial of these requests was not seen as a violation of the
right to manifest religious beliefs and, contrary to the
UNHRC, the ECtHR did not recognise a duty to
accommodate or tolerate these religious practices under
Article 9 ECHR.77 Also in the cases regarding old reli-
72. For an approach focusing on the factor of ‘European consensus’, see K.
Henrard, ‘How the European Court of Human Rights’ Concern Regard-
ing European Consensus Tempers the Effective Protection of Freedom
of Religion’, 4(3) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 398 (2015).
73. Masaev v. Moldova, App. no. 6303/05 (ECHR, 12 May 2009).
74. Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], ECHR 2000-XI 117.
75. Kosteski v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. no.
55170/00 (ECHR, 13 April 2006).
76. See, for example, ECtHR Aktas v. France, above n. 8.
77. For a broader account of this issue, see K. Henrard, ‘Duties of Reasona-
ble Accommodation in Relation to Religion and the European Court of
Human Rights: A Closer Look at the Prohibition of Discrimination, the
Freedom of Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality’, 5(1) Eras-
mus Law Review 59 (2012); Henrard (2012), above n. 61; contrary to
the ECtHR, the CoE Parliamentary Assembly has called on Member
States to promote reasonable accommodation as ‘a pragmatic means of
ensuring the effective and full enjoyment of freedom of religion’ (Res
2036 (2015), at para. 2).
gious minorities’ manifestations of religious beliefs in
the public sphere, the ECtHR found very few to no vio-
lations. The ECtHR for example did not conclude for a
duty of the State to change the dates of court proceed-
ings when they coincide with Jewish holidays.78 Also a
complaint brought by an adherent of the Baptist Church
requesting exemption from sexual education class was
not even examined on the merits, but declared inadmis-
sible.79
When looking at this presentation of case law, it seems
thus that the basic assumption that the ECtHR offers a
weaker protection to religious manifestations in the pub-
lic sphere might be able to explain the significant differ-
ence in the percentages of violations, no violations and
inadmissibility decisions among the different minority
groups.80 Although this approach can be questioned, it
does in principle not indicate double standards if
applied consistently. Yet, one particularly interesting
exception in the ECtHR’s restrictive approach to old
and new religious minorities’ manifestations of religious
belief in the public sphere can be identified among the
cases included in the conducted empirical research:
Exemptions for Jehovah’s Witnesses from military serv-
ice.
4.2.2 The Exception to the Rule: Jehovah’s Witnesses’
Objection to Military Service
Although the issue of conscientious objection to military
service by Jehovah’s Witnesses81 clearly concerns the
public sphere, the ECtHR decided that States have an
obligation to accommodate these beliefs by exempting
Jehovah’s Witnesses from military service in order to
respect their religious beliefs.82 Taking a closer look at
this issue, it appears striking to see that the approach of
the ECtHR, respectively the EComHR, was initially in
contradiction with the UNHRC.
As early as 1966, the EComHR was confronted with a
complaint of a Jehovah’s Witness alleging a violation of
Article 9 ECHR due to the refusal of German authori-
78. See S. H. and H. V. v. Austria, App. no. 18960/91 (EComHR, 13 Janu-
ary 1993); Sessa v. Italy, ECHR 2012 149 (extracts).
79. Dojan and others v. Germany, App. nos. 319/08, 2455/08 and
7908/10 (ECHR, 13 September 2011).
80. This restrictive interpretation can also be linked with the different
understanding of the concept of secularism developed by the UNHRC
and the ECtHR; see A. Barras, ‘Transnational Understandings of Secular-
isms and Their Impact on the Right to Religious Freedom – Exploring
Religious Symbols Cases at the UN and ECHR’, 11(2) Journal of Human
Rights 263, at 265 ff. (2012).
81. It needs to be noted that various religious minority groups brought
complaints regarding conscientious objection to military service; see, for
a detailed overview, H. Takemura, International Human Right to Con-
scientious Objection to Military Service and Individual Duties to Diso-
bey Manifestly Illegal Orders (2009), in particular at 19 ff. This article
focuses however on cases brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses due to the
reasons specified in Section 2.2.
82. Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], ECHR 2011-IV 1; see P. Muzny, ‘Bayatyan v
Armenia: The Grand Chamber Renders a Grand Judgment’, 12(1)
Human Rights Law Review 135 (2012).
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ties to exempt him from military service.83 The
EComHR did not find a violation of the applicant’s
right to freedom of religion. It based its argumentation
on Article 4(3b) ECHR, which states that the term pro-
hibition of forced and compulsory labour shall not include
‘any service of a military character or, in case of consci-
entious objectors in countries where they are recog-
nised, service exacted instead of compulsory military
service’. According to the interpretation of the
EComHR, Article 9 ECHR was therefore not applicable
to conscientious objectors. Hence, the complaint was
declared manifestly ill-founded and thus inadmissible.
Like the question of the interpretation of new religious
minorities’ religious manifestations in the public sphere,
the exemption from military service was a controversial
issue at the time, which was seen to be best left to the
discretion of Member States.84
While the EComHR confirmed this approach in subse-
quent decisions, not only concerning Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses,85 the ECtHR avoided touching upon the issue.
This can be seen in a complaint brought by two reli-
gious ministers of the Central Congregation of the
Christian Jehovah’s Witnesses of Greece,86 which the
ECtHR only examined under Article 5 ECHR and
declared that the detention of the applicants based on
their refusal to perform military service was not lawful.
It was, however, not seen as necessary to examine the
complaint under Article 9 ECHR.
While at first following the EComHR’s approach to
conscientious objection to military service in two cases
concerning objection based on ethical grounds,87 the
UNHRC recognised a right to conscientious objection
first in an obiter dictum in a recommendation in the
framework of the individual complaint procedure in
199188 and then, more clearly, in its General Comment
No. 22 in 1993.89 This was subsequently confirmed in
the first individual complaint brought by a Jehovah’s
Witness to the UNHRC against the Republic of Korea
in 2006.90 It appears interesting to highlight that Article
8(3) ICCPR excludes military and civil service from the
scope of the prohibition of forced labour with the exact
same wording as Article 4(3b) ECHR. The UNHRC’s
revision of the interpretation of this provision led thus
83. Grandrath v. Germany, App. no. 2299/64 (ECHR, 12 December 1966).
It is worth noting that the applicant in question did not only object to
performing military service, but also to substitute civil service; neverthe-
less, the EComHR’s reasoning clearly also includes exemption from mili-
tary service alone.
84. See Muzny, above n. 82.
85. See, for example, X. v. Germany (1977), 9 DR 201; Heudens v. Bel-
gium, App. no. 24630/94 (ECHR, 22 May 1995).
86. Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece, above n. 36.
87. UNHRC Muhonen v. Finland, UN Doc. A/40/40, 8 April 1985; see also
UNHRC L.T.K. v. Finland, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, 9 July 1985.
88. UNHRC J.P. v. Canada, UN Doc. A/47/40, 7 November 1991, at para.
4.2.
89. UNHRC, ‘General Comment 22 on Article 18 ICCPR’, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, 27 September 1993, at para 11. See for fur-
ther details, in particular the drafting history, Takemura, above n. 81, at
56 ff.
90. UNHRC Yeo-Bum Yoon and Myung-Jin Choi v. Republic of Korea, UN
Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1321-1322/2004, 13 November 2006; see also
Takemura, above n. 81, at 70 ff.
to a direct contradiction with the ECtHR’s standing
case law at that time, as according to the UNHRC, the
provision was neither intended to ‘recognize[s] nor
exclude[s] a right of conscientious objection’.91 The
UNHRC then arrived at the conclusion that the Repub-
lic of Korea had to foresee a procedure for the recogni-
tion of conscientious objections against military
service.92
In 2011, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR overturned
the long-standing, settled case law in the case Bayatyan
v. Armenia.93 It arrived at this conclusion based on three
main arguments, which are worth highlighting: First, it
voiced doubts that the interpretation given to Article
4(3b) ECHR by the EComHR ‘reflects the true purpose
and meaning of this provision’,94 as according to the
travaux préparatoires the provision was not intended to
have a delimiting effect on the guarantees of Article 9
ECHR.95 This shows the importance the ECtHR
attached in this case to the interpretation based on the
object and purpose of the ECHR, which might be
inspired by the UNHRC’s reasoning in the respective
decisions.96
Second, the ECtHR referred to important developments
on the national and international level since the last
decision taken by the EComHR in this regard.97 It spe-
cifically mentioned the practice of the UNHRC98 and
stated that ‘in defining the meaning of terms and
notions in the text of the Convention, the Court can and
must take into account elements of international law
other than the Convention and the interpretation of
such elements by competent organs’.99 Considering that
in its decision the ECtHR then followed the approach
taken by the UNHRC, this is a strong statement for the
coherence of human rights interpretation.
Third, the ECtHR clearly recognised Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses as a religious minority whose religious freedom
needs to be respected in order to achieve religious har-
mony and tolerance in society. It stated that ‘providing
[Jehovah’s Witnesses] with the opportunity to serve
society as dictated by their conscience might, far from
creating unjust inequalities or discrimination as claimed
by the Government, rather ensure cohesive and stable plu-
91. UNHRC, General Comment 22, above n. 89, at para. 8.2.
92. This approach was confirmed in subsequent decisions regarding the
Republic of Korea, Turkey and Turkmenistan; see, for example, the
most recent decision UNHRC Sunnet Japparow v. Turkmenistan, UN
Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2223/2012, 29 October 2015.
93. ECtHR Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], above n. 82; the Chamber decision
did not find a violation: Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. no. 23459/03
(ECHR, 27 October 2009); see, for a critique of the Chamber decision
the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Power as well as Muzny, above n. 82,
at 138 ff.
94. ECtHR Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], above n. 82, at para. 100.
95. See also Muzny, above n. 82, at 141.
96. See also M. Burbergs, ‘Recognizing the Right to Conscientious Objec-
tion – Part I – Correcting a Mistake’, Strasbourg Observers (20 July
2011); available at: <https:// strasbourgobservers. com/ 2011/ 07/ 20/
recognizing -the -right -to -conscientious -objection -%E2%80%93 -part -i -
%E2%80%93 -correcting -a -mistake/>.
97. See, concerning the role played by the concept of European consensus
in this decision, Henrard (2012), above n. 61, at 975.
98. ECtHR Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], above n. 82, at para. 105.
99. Ibid., at para. 102.
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ralism and promote religious harmony and tolerance in soci-
ety’.100
5 Conclusion
The example of the exemption from military service for
Jehovah’s Witnesses (and others) shows that the inter-
pretation of human rights is not set in stone, but evolves
with time.101 In the case of Bayatyan v. Armenia, this
change was in particular motivated by the need to pro-
tect Jehovah’s Witnesses as a religious minority and to
respect ‘pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness [as
the] hallmarks of a “democratic society”’.102 In this
sense, respect towards and accommodation of the beliefs
of a minority religious group was seen as ensuring
‘cohesive and stable pluralism and promot[ing] religious
harmony and tolerance in society’.103 Such principles
can already be found in the preambles of the interna-
tional human rights instruments, which pursue the aim
to establish justice and peace in the world.104
Applied to the interpretation of new minorities’ right to
manifest their religious beliefs, it can be stated that the
case law of the ECtHR is not in line with these common
guiding principles:105 Instead of promoting pluralism
and tolerance, the right to religious freedom of those
groups is restricted in the name of social unity. Yet,
experience shows that restricting the religious liberty of
a large number of citizens does not lead to religious har-
mony and peace, but rather to exclusion and social con-
flict.106 Also, the political theorist Iris Marion Young
stated that ‘reduc[ing] the differently similar to the same
[…] turns the merely different into the absolutely other
[and] inevitably generates dichotomy instead of
unity’.107 Such concerns for respect of the basic princi-
ples of pluralism and tolerance seem to be attributed
stronger weight in the decisions of the UNHRC regard-
ing new minorities’ right to freedom of religion, which
thus rightly refused to follow the ECtHR’s approach in
this regard.
Could the UNHRC thus, not only for coherence’s sake,
serve as a role model for the ECtHR (again)? Recent
decisions of the ECtHR in the area of religious freedom
100. Ibid., at para. 126 (emphasis added).
101. In this regard, it is important to mention that the ECtHR, since a long
time, regards the ECHR as a living instrument subject to dynamic inter-
pretation; see already ECtHR Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. no.
5856/72 (ECHR, 25 April 1978), at para. 31.
102. ECtHR Bayatyan v Armenia [GC], above n. 82, at para. 126.
103. Ibid.
104. ECHR preamble; ICCPR preamble.
105. See also S.E. Berry, ‘A Tale of Two Instruments: Religious Minorities and
the Council of Europe’s Rights Regime’, 30 Netherlands Quarterly of
Human Rights 10 (2012); K. Henrard, The Ambiguous Relationship
between Religious Minorities and Fundamental (Minority) Rights
(2011), at 53 ff.
106. C. Wellmann, ‘Religious Human Rights and Peace’, 11 Journal of
Human Rights 210, at 215 (2012); E. Craig, ‘From Security to Justice?
The Development of a More Justice-Oriented Approach to the Realisa-
tion of European Minority Rights Standards’, 30 Netherlands Quarterly
of Human Rights 40 (2012).
107. I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990), at 99.
seem to show at least some signs of a less restrictive
approach to the right to freedom of religion also in the
public sphere.108 As an example from the cases included
in the conducted empirical research, the judgment Kar-
aahmed v. Bulgaria109 can be mentioned, which con-
cerned a violent clash in front of a mosque between
members of a nationalist party and Muslim worship-
pers. The members of the Muslim community in the
mosque in question belonged to the old Muslim minori-
ty in Bulgaria, but also came from immigration coun-
tries such as Turkey. Although the party stated as its
primary motivation the allegedly disturbing call for
prayers coming from the mosque in question, the state-
ments and actions of the party’s members showed that
they were in fact moved by racial and religious intoler-
ance towards Turkish immigrants. The ECtHR found
that Bulgarian authorities had violated their positive
obligations flowing from Article 9 ECHR, as they did
not ‘strike a proper balance in the steps they took to
ensure the effective and peaceful exercise of the rights of
the demonstrators and the rights of the […] worship-
pers to pray together’.110
Other cases, however, paint a rather mixed picture. One
can think for example of the cases Ebrahimian v.
France,111 in which the ECtHR found that the wearing
of a headscarf was a legitimate reason for the non-
renewal of the employment contract of a nurse in a pub-
lic hospital, or the most recent case Osmanoğlu and
Kocabaş v. Switzerland,112 where the refusal to grant
Muslim students exemption from mixed-sex swimming
classes was not seen as amounting to a violation of their
right to manifest their religious beliefs. Lastly, also
S.A.S. v. France,113 in which the Grand Chamber of the
ECtHR found that the prohibition to wear a burqa in
public places did not violate Article 9 ECHR, has to be
mentioned. The latter decision even led to a division
within the Council of Europe: The CoE Commissioner
for Human Rights, for example, had stated before that a
general burqa ban would raise serious questions con-
cerning its compatibility with the ECHR because it
would lead to ‘further exclusion and alienation in Euro-
pean societies’.114
Yet, from a more optimistic perspective one can estab-
lish that these decisions at least involved an examination
on the merits, as opposed to earlier complaints, which
had been declared manifestly ill-founded and thus inad-
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missible.115 This might be a sign that the ECtHR is tak-
ing the difficulties, which new religious minorities are
encountering in realising their human right to manifest
their religious beliefs, more seriously and is slowly
reconsidering its approach.
115. See, for the importance of sufficient reasoning and the problematic dec-
laration as manifestly ill-founded, Gerards, above n. 53, at 154 ff.;
Brems and Lavrysen (2013), above n. 67, at 180 ff.
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